

Ref No 447

Excerpts From

MISSION TO MOSCOW

By JOSEPH E. DAVIES,

United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1936 to 1938

(The Blakiston Company, Philadelphia)

Diary

Washington--January 4, 1937

Formal dinner given in our honor by Ambassador and Madame Saito at the Japanese Embassy. Saito is an old friend and golfing companion at "Burning Tree." It was a very pleasant gesture on his part to want to entertain for us. I was perplexed, however, for I was going to Moscow, and Japan and Moscow were scarcely on speaking terms. So I decided to be entirely undiplomatic and go to Saito frankly with the problem. He saw the point at once and said, "That's simple. We shall ask my colleague, the Soviet Ambassador, and Madame Troyanovsky," and my problem was solved with a most pleasant evening. Over the coffee international relations were furthered by a suggestion of organizing an international group of "Burning Tree" Golf Clubs similar to International Rotary. There was no question but what Washington's "Burning Tree" would have to be number one. Party almost broke up over whether number two was to be Tokyo or Moscow. It was referred to the League of Nations!!

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Moscow, November 16, 1937

The Soviet Union has definitely determined, at least for the present, not to become involved in active military participation, but it would aid China to the extent that it could and still maintain a correct diplomatic position vis-a-vis Japan.

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AUSTRIAN EFFECT ON WAR PSYCHOLOGY

March 17, 1938

Excerpt from a Letter to Senator Millard Tydings

Along with the rest of Europe, this country is extremely war conscious. Enormous shipments are being sent to the Far East. The shipments include war materials and foodstuffs. There are many indications of shortage here in food that did not obtain last winter, in spite of the huge crop last summer. There are indications that this government is going more isolationist than ever before. War is terribly close.

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By JOSEPH E. DAVIES

*Ref. Hoch 1447*

(p. 254)

LITVINOV FEARS A "FASCIST PEACE"

Litvinov said he foresaw a Fascist peace imposed by Germany and Italy and that history would be likely to be repeated in that the present finds Italy making friends with Germany because of fear, with the intention probably of deserting her when the situation seemingly becomes expedient, just as she did during the World War. Italy, he added, is by no means safely anchored to the Hitler axis.

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(p. 255)

Regarding the Far Eastern situation, he said that Japan has approximately a million men in China, including 300,000 in Manchukuo, and that the Chinese were putting up a remarkable fight and causing Japan much trouble. He indicated he did not anticipate any aggressive action from Japan against the Soviet Union.

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Diary

Moscow--March 26, 1938

Commissar Litvinov and daughter came. He said that Stalin was arranging to see me before my departure. This surprised me very much. He sees no one, except it be some visiting head of government from without the country. It is said that he has never seen an ambassador formally. It would be interesting to meet him. I should like to size him up.

\*\*\*\*\*

Moscow, March 29, 1938

There is little change in the border situation, with only one minor incident reported. This may be due in some measure to preoccupation of the Japanese military authorities with the war in China. In this connection, by far the most interesting development regarding the Far Eastern relations during the recent past has been the statement, made to me in the course of a conversation which took place on March 23, last, by M. Litvinov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, in which he stated that any aggression against the Soviet Union on the part of Japan is now out of the question, on account of the trouble which China is causing Japan by its (China's) unexpected military success. This, he stated, was shown by the fact that Japan now has a million men under arms in China proper and another three hundred thousand in Manchuria.

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Moscow, April 1, 1938

JAPAN

In the Far East, from what Commissar Litvinov tells me, this government believes that Japan is having a hard time of it in China and that the Chinese are now putting up substantial resistance. This government does not conceal its deep sympathy for China, but is meticulously careful to maintain peace with Japan, at least for the present.

Excerpts From  
MISSION TO MOSCOW  
By JOSEPH E. DAVIES

Key-Koz#1447  
(pp. 266-267)

WAR AND WAR PSYCHOLOGY

One fourth of the national revenues were appropriated last year to war purposes. This amounts to approximately twenty-five billion rubles. At the current bootleg gold value of the ruble, this approximates two to two and one half billion dollars. Expenditures this year will probably be still greater. There are indications of an almost feverish preparation for war. Immense stocks of foods and supplies, including military equipment, tanks, submarine chasers, airplanes, trucks, and so forth, are reported by travelers as being sent to the Far East in an unending stream. There is a shortage of fabric here in Moscow, which did not exist last year, and which is alleged to be due to war requirements.

Those industrial organizations which are directly connected with war requirements have been recently placed under direct army control and supervision.

It is variously estimated that the Far Eastern Army consists of from 250,000 to 500,000 men. It is alleged to be completely self-contained with an adequate two-year supply of food and military requirements. Annually 1,200,000 youths are called to the colors for training. There are constant rumors of roads and fortifications being secretly and hurriedly built all along the western frontier. The current strength of the army is reputed to be 1,200,000 men.

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THE CLOSING OF FOREIGN CONSULATES

(p. 268)

The purposes of the Fascist governments of isolating the U.S.S.R. among the nations of the world and placing them in quarantine, so to speak, seems to have worked not only successfully from without this country but also seems to have been most effective here. The Soviet Union in retaliation, or for reasons of its own, appears to be perfectly willing to out-Herod Herod in this respect. And they have a faculty for hitting first and hard if they think they are in danger.

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SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD JAPANESE PROTESTS

JOURNAL

Moscow--April 4, 1938

It is announced by the press that the Foreign Commissar received a protest from the Japanese Ambassador against the military assistance which he asserted the government was giving to China.

M. Litvinov is reported to have replied that their attitude in selling arms, etc., to China was in complete accordance with the principles of international law. He denied that they had sent any military detachments or individual military persons to that country to participate in war action.



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COMMUNISM NO WORLD DANGER

Moscow, April 4, 1938

Personally, I do not think that the world is in any real danger from communism for many years to come. Communism won't work. It hasn't worked here.

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The French Ambassador has said to me that the Comintern (the agency for the international revolution idea) is resorted to by Stalin, not because of desire, but purely as a military and strategic necessity.

\*\*\*\*\*

Diary

Moscow--April 14, 1938

Mr. Ralph Black, Vice-Consul at Kobe, Japan, passing through en route for home, came in for lunch. He is a keen, fine-appearing young man--a credit to the service. He is highly intelligent and well balanced and careful in his expression of opinions or facts.

He stated that in Japan there were indications of economic pressure, caused by the war, making their appearance, and that there was much discussion and fear of possible Russian air attacks on the "wood and paper" cities of Japan.

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RUSSIA AND JAPAN

Journal

Moscow--June 4, 1938

The following is my best judgment as to the situation here with reference to Japan:

1. Soviet-Japanese relations are very difficult; constant difficulties were being experienced in the Island of Saghalien in connection with the operation of Japanese concessions; where, necessarily, reliance was placed in large part upon Soviet employees; these difficulties, it is claimed by some, arise primarily from the fact that such Soviet employees, fearing charges of being Trotskyites and Japanese spies and wreckers, refused to have anything whatever to do with the Japanese; that there were also other matters of serious difference.

I have the impression that the attitude of Russian diplomacy is definitely hardening toward Japan and more aggressive than last summer.

2. According to reliable information there are approximately 450,000 to 600,000 Soviet armed troops in the eastern area. It is stated, however, that the Japanese believe that for every Japanese soldier in Manchukuo the Soviets maintained, in Manchuria, three Soviet soldiers. The Japanese armed forces in Manchuria are estimated to be from 150,000 to 200,000 in number. This checks with other information current here.

Litvinov recently advised me that the Japanese were extensive buyers of Soviet rubles "outside"; that this accounted for the rise in the price of the "black" ruble, and that in his opinion Japan was procuring rubles for the purposes of bribery in the East.

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Excerpts From  
MISSION TO MOSCOW  
By JOSEPH E. DAVIES

(p. 352)

WHAT ARE THE POLITICAL STRENGTHS OF THIS GOVERNMENT:

The Communist Party and the Government--The government in fact consists of a very small group of men, who control the Communist Party. The government is no more than the agent of the Communist Party, and takes orders from it. Realistically, the government is in fact one man--Stalin the "strong" man, who survived the contest, completely disposed of all competitors, and is completely dominant. He appears to be the type of "easy boss," quiet, self-effacing, but nevertheless the real power. The government is a dictatorship not "of the proletariat," as professed, but "over the proletariat." It is completely dominated by one man.

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(p. 365-366)

SUMMARY

V.

The military strength of the U.S.S.R. is impressive. In both quality and numbers the man power is extraordinary. The standing army of approximately 1,500,000 men is divided into two self-contained units, one in the West and one in the Orient -- about 70% in the West and 30% in the East. It is well equipped with side arms and well disciplined and trained to fanatical devotion to Communism. Its mechanized units are very good. The air-force personnel is excellent--their equipment good in pursuit planes, poor in bombing equipment. Numerically the air force is probably the strongest of the great powers. In air equipment, generally speaking, they probably are two or three years behind the Western nations.

The government is supremely confident that it could successfully resist simultaneous attack by Japan and Germany.

VII.

The significance to the United States is quite clear. If Japan should go berserk by any chance, the fact that Russia is at her back door is of consequence to us.

The Soviet Union is more friendly to the United States than to any foreign power. That is quite clear.

If the U.S.S.R. should be excluded from the proposed Four-Power Pact and become isolated (as it now seems to be convinced it will be), there is reason to believe that it may continue to live unto itself and develop indefinitely. It may develop into a very potential threat to world economic and political stability. Communism holds no serious threat to the United States. Friendly relations in the future may be of great general value.

I have the honor to be, Sir, respectfully yours,

Joseph E. Davies

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Excerpts From  
MISSION TO MOSCOW  
By Joseph E. Davies

Diary

Brussels--September 16, 1939

Within two weeks after the declaration of war by Britain and France on Germany, the Russians and Japanese have agreed, according to the press reports, for an armistice on Far Eastern front. Thus not only has Hitler closed his eastern door in Europe, but he has solidified his position by composing the differences between Japan and Russia in the Far East.

The Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement was a diplomatic victory for Germany that was far-reaching in its effect.

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"THE RUSSIAN BEAR HAS TAKEN A HANDSOME REVENGE FOR MUNICH."

Brussels, October 12, 1939

Stalin's whole plan since 1926 has been to develop an internal economy that would be self-sufficient and create a socialistic communistic community that would be a model for the world; and he said to me himself that they figured that for him and his associates to achieve that was a man-sized job and as much as they could do, without trying to run the whole world.

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Journal

Brussels--November 28, 1939

Three months have now elapsed since "the state of war" was declared by England. It has developed many surprises. They were:

The Germans made good on their prediction of demolishing Poland in three weeks. That was surprising to some.

Apparently the Moscow agreement envisaged a complete restoration of the geographical and political spheres of tsarist Russia to the Soviets, and more, to wit: the uprooting and abandoning of the Baltic German civilization and life, as well as the restoration of Polish White Russia and Polish Ukraine to the U.S.S.R. as a part of the deal with Germany. The Soviets are willing to risk alienating world opinion and that of many world Communists by attacking Finland to complete the naval outpost fortification of Leningrad against possible future attack by an enemy, who can only be conceived to be their present ally, Germany. Such an anachronism seemed impossible a few months ago.

Nor would the well informed have conceived it possible six months ago that Germany would pay so high a price to Russia in order to close her eastern door when attacking Poland.

The implied threat to England and France contained in Ribbentrop's Moscow statement that "consultations as to the necessary steps" to be taken jointly, unless the western nations stopped their war on Germany, had, apparently no real basis in any agreement with Molotov. The "necessary steps" were not taken, or proved abortive. Instead of embarking on such action, Molotov declared the policy of the U.S.S.R. to be one of neutrality. Thus Hitler closed his eastern door, but he paid a very high price.

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(p. 410)

RUSSIA--FINLAND

Undoubtedly the Finns have set the Russians back in a very heroic way. The probability of negotiated peace between Russia and Finland is, in my opinion, not now imminent. The Russian army is a god to the Communists. Honour-propre and perhaps even self-preservation itself would require the established authorities to throw all of their might and numbers into the fight to re-establish lost army prestige. Finland can't stand out against such a machine. After that, peace will come on Soviet terms.



Ref. No. #1447

「モスコーへの使命」抜萃

ジョセフ・イ・デイヴィス著

(一九三六年より一九三八年迄駐米日大使)  
フィラデルフィア・ブラキストン會社版

日記

一九三七年一月四日 ワシントン

日本大使館にて齋藤大使夫妻の正式晩餐會の主賓として招かる。

齋藤は舊友であり「バーニング・ツリー」のゴルフ仲間である。

彼が我々を歓迎したいと云ふことは大へん嬉しい友好的行爲だつた。<sup>1</sup>

私がモスコーへ行かうとして居る際、而も日本とモスコーの間も云は

ぬ程他の悪い折からの事として自分としては解せない事であつた、そこ

で私は全く非外交的に齋藤に對しそのことを率直に當つてみることに

決めた。

彼はこの點すぐ了解して呉れて「お安い御用です。我が同僚、ソヴィ

エット大使及びトロヤノフスキイ天人を招待しませう」と言つたので

この極めて楽しい夕と共に問題は解決した。

珈琲をのみながら國際ロータリー俱樂部に似たバーニング。ツリー  
ゴルフ俱樂部といふ國際團體を組織する提議があり國際的關係の話が  
進んだ、別に質問はなかつたが何れのワシントンのバーニングツリー  
が第一になるかと云ふことが問題であつた。

晩餐會は第二は東京がモスコイの問題で殆ど分裂してしまつた事だ  
ある。之は國際聯盟に委託された。

一九三七年十一月十六日 於モスコイ

ソ聯は少くとも現在の所、積極的且事行動に關與せざる事を明確に  
決定した。だがソ聯は日本に對して正當な外交的地位を維持出來る程  
度には支那を援助する

戦争心理に及ぼせる 大利の影響

一九三八年三月十七日

ミラード。タイディングス上院議員宛書簡抜萃



他のヨーロッパ諸國同様此國は極めて戦争意識を持つてゐる。極東に  
 歴大を積荷を送つてゐる、積荷の中味は軍需品と食糧を含んでゐる。  
 昨夏の大量の收穫にかゝはらず昨年の冬缺乏した食糧不足の徴候が多分  
 にある。此の政府は從來以上に孤立主義化する徴候がある。極東に  
 戦争は恐しい程間近に迫つて居る。

リイヴィノフ「ファッシスト的平和」を怖る。(二五四頁)アソシ

リトヴィノフ曰く「私は獨伊の強制するファッシスト的平和なるものを  
 予知し伊太利が獨逸を恐怖の故に盟友と形勢不利ありと見る時、恰も世界  
 大戦の時同様ドイツを見捨てて意圖である現狀に於ては、歴史は再び繰  
 返される可能性があると思つて居る。」と。  
 更に曰く「伊太利は決して、ヒトラー極權に確實にその身を委ねて居る  
 ではない。」と。

極東の形勢に關し曰く「滿洲に於ける三十萬を含み日本は支那に百萬  
 の兵を有し、支那人は敢然注目に向する戰術を爲し日本を痛く悩ませて  
 居る。」といふ。



或程度之は、日本軍當局が對支戦争に心を奪はれてゐる情であらう。此の事に關しては、最近に於ける極東關係の最も興味のあることは、ソ聯外務人民委員リトヴィノフが昨五月二十三日の會見の際余に對して聲明したことである。即ちその聲明で彼の云つたことは日本側よりする對蘇攻撃は支那が豫期せざる戦果を擧げ日本に難局を齎させたことにより問題外となり此の事は、支那本土に日本が現在約百萬、滿洲に三十萬の武装した兵を有す<sup>も</sup>で明らかであると述べて居る。



日本

一九三八年四月一日モスコウ

リトヴィン人民委員が余に語る所によれば、當國政府は極東で日本が支那に於て經濟にあらざる事及び支那人が現在實質的抵抗を敢行しつつある事を信じて居る。

政府は支那に對し深甚なる同情を隠さないが然し少くとも當面は於ては日本に對して平和維持の苦心の注意を拂つてゐる。

戦争と戦争心算

(二六六一—二六七頁)

歳人の四分の一は昨年戦争に充てられた。

約二百五十億ルーブルに達する。ルーブルの現在密輸入價格は約二十億乃至二十五億ドルである。本年度支出は恐らく更に増加しよう。

戦争に對する強く熱狂的な準備の兆候がある。

食糧物資の莫大な量が(軍需品、戦争、隱潛艇、航空機、トラック、其他を含む)絶えず極東に送られて居ると旅行者は報じてゐる。

此所モスコウには昨年には無かつた織物不足がある。戦争の需要によるものと看做されて居るものである。

軍需に直接關係する産業組織は最近軍の直轄下に置かれた。

板東軍は二十五萬乃至五十萬であると種々に算出され二ヶ年分の食糧と軍需を有し完全に自給自足と云はれてゐる

毎年百二十萬の青年が訓練の爲軍旗の下に召集される

西部國境に沿つて秘密且急速に道路要塞が建築されつゝあるといふ噂が絶えずある。

軍の現有兵力は百二十萬と稱されて居る。

#### 外國領館の閉鎖

(二六八頁)

フアツシスト政府が蘇聯を世界の諸國の中に孤立せしめ交通を遮断せんとする目的は外國よりみて成功せるのみならず當地に於ても極めて有効であつた。

蘇聯は報復として或は獨自の理由を以て此の點では極めて殘虐なる行爲も辭せぬと見られる。彼等は自分達が危険に面して居ると考へれば強烈に先手を打つ性質を持つてゐる。

日本の抗議に對するソヴィエトの態度

於莫斯科 一九三八年四月四日

新聞記事

新聞に依れば、日大使はソ聯政府が支那に軍事援助を與へたと斷言し外務人員に抗議を提出せる由。

之に對しリトヴィノフ氏は對支武器販賣その他は完全に國際法に準據するものなる旨回答したいといふ。彼はソ聯が一部軍隊或は個々の軍人を支那に戦争参加に派兵せる事を否定した。

共產主義世界の危険ならず

モスコ 一九三八年四月四日

余個人としては、長き將來に亘り世界が共產主義により何等の危険に陷るものとは考へない。共產主義は皆く行かない、此處は皆くはいつては居ない。

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フランス大使が余に語る所によれば、コミンテルン（國際革命思想機關）



はスターリンによつて、欲望の爲にはなく純粹な軍事及戰略的必要から作られたといふ。

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日記

モスコ 一九三八年四月十四日

歸國の途にある在日大神戸副領事ラルフ・ブレイク氏來り晝食す。氏は熱心にして自分の職務に益ある風采の立派な青年である。賢明にして常識にとみ意見開陳に當つても事實を述べるにも慎重である。

氏は日本國內では戦争の結果、經濟的逼迫が著しくなり且、可能なる露西亞の日本の「木と紙」の都市空襲が陰じられ且又恐れられて居る事を述べた。

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露西亞と日本

新聞 於モスコ 一九三八年六月四日

此地に於ける日本に關する狀勢は余の最上の判斷では次の如くである。  
一、日蘇關係は非常に難しい。葛藤は絶えず樺太島に於て日本人利權効

力に關聯して行はれて居る。當島では當然大体ソ聯使用人が信頼を受けて居る。或る者の言によればかゝる葛藤はソ聯使用人がトロツキー派、日本側スパイ或は破壊者たる嫌疑を恐れて日本人に關係する事を拒絶する事實に主として發するといふ。更に重大な葛藤が他にもある。

余の印象では、露西亞の對日外交態度は硬化しつつあり昨年夏に比して、更に挑戰的になつてゐる。

二、確かな情報によれば東方地區には約四十五萬乃至六十萬のソ聯軍隊が居るといふ。然も日本側では在滿日本兵一人に對しソ聯は三人宛滿洲に保持せりと信じて居る由。在滿日本軍隊はその數十五萬乃至二十萬と豫想されてゐる。此の情報は當地に於ける他の情報と合致するものである。

最近リトヴィノフは余に次の如く知らせた。即ちソ聯貨幣ルーブルを日本人が手廣く國外から買出してゐる。此の事がルーブルの闇價格昂騰の理由である。更に彼の意見では日本は東洋に於ける賄賂の爲にルーブルを獲得しつつあるのであるといふ。

當政府の政治力は (三五二頁)

共產黨と政府——事實上此政府は共產黨を支配する極く少數の人のグループから成る。政府は共產黨の代行機關たるに過ぎず黨から指圖を受ける。

現實的に言へば政府は事實上一人の人間である。強人スターリン・鬭争に勝残り完全に凡ゆる競争者を片附け完全に支配權を握つて居る。

彼は靜かで獻身的な「寛大な親分」さいふタイプに見えるが、底力がある此の政府は彼等が公言する如きプロレタリアートの統理下にあるのではなくプロレタリアートの上に立つてゐる獨裁である。完全に一人の男により支配されて居るのだ。

摘 要

(三六五頁—三六六頁)

五、

ソ聯兵力は強い印象を與へる。質量共にその兵力は異常である。約百五十



萬の常備軍は自給自足の二つに分れ約七〇%が西部に他は三〇%が東部に  
ある。此の軍隊は携帯兵器を良く装備し良く軍紀を奉ひ、共產主義に  
對する熱狂的献身をなす迄訓練を施されて居る。機械化部隊が非常に良  
い。空軍は優秀である。その装備は追撃機に於て秀で爆撃裝置に於て劣  
る。數的にはその空軍は列國中悉く最弱であらう。  
航空機裝備に於ては大體西洋諸國に二三年遅れて居る。ソ聯政府は日獨  
同時攻撃に會ふも充分抵抗し得る。最大の自信を有して居る。

米國に對する意義は極めて明確である。若し何等かの機會に於て日本が  
無茶な行動に出るならば日本の背後にロシアがあるといふ事實は我々に  
取つて重大である。

ソ聯は米國に對しては他の諸外國以上に友好的である。  
之は極めて確實な事である。

若しソ聯が四國條約計劃から除外され孤立するならば（さうなる如く現  
在ソ聯は考へてゐる様にみられる）

ソ聯が獨自でその生存を持續し且無限に發展をなすに足る理由がある。世界經濟及び政治的安定にさう極めて有力な脅威となるかも知れない。

共産主義は米國に取つて何等重大な脅威ではない。友好關係は將來大々な普遍的價值を有するであらう。

ジョゼフ・イー・デイヴィス 拜

日 記

於

ブラッセル

一九三九年九月十六日

英佛對獨宣戰二週間にして、新聞の傳ふる所によればソ聯及日本は極東國境に於ける休戦に同意したといふ。かくてロットラーはその歐洲に於ける東の門戸を閉ざせるのみならず日蘇極東の不和を緩和して彼の位置を確固たるものにした。

リッペントロツブーモロトフ協定は深甚なる効果を有しドイツの外交的勝利である。

露西面 ミュンヘンへ見事な復讐をなす。

於

ブラッセル

一九三九年十月十二日

一九二六年以降スターリンの凡ゆる計劃は國內經濟の自給自足化促進及び世界の範たるベト社會主義的共產主義的社會の創始にあつた。彼自身余に語る所では、それは彼及同志に取つて手に餘る程の仕事であり世界を支配する所か、それだけで餘力が費やされなくてはならぬと云ふ。



## 新聞記事

於 プラツクル 一九三九年十一月二十八日

英國が「戦争状態」を宣言して茲に三箇月を経過した。此の宣言は色々思ひ掛けない物件をかもし出した。即ちドイツ人はその豫言通り三週間でポーランドを撃破した。一部の人には之は驚異であつた。

モスコ協定は明らかに帝政ロシアの地理的政治的領域のソヴィエットへの完全回復を目的としそれに止るのみではない。即ち對獨交渉の一部としてポーランド領、白色ロシア及ウクライナをソ聯に回復する事並バルチック、ドイツの文化及生活の絶滅放棄をも含んでゐる。

將來可能なる敵、即ち現在の同盟國獨逸を想像されるのだがこの敵の攻撃に對するレニングラードの海軍の前哨要塞完成の爲のフィンランド攻撃により世界の輿論と世界の共產主義者の輿論を敢て無視した。

かゝした時代錯誤は二三ヶ月前なら不可能と思はれて居た事である。更に消息に通じたる者は六ヶ月以前にはドイツがポーランド攻撃の際、東の門戸を閉鎖する爲ロシアにかゝる高價な代價を支拂ふ事が可能とばかり考へなかつた。

リッペントロップのモスコイ聲明に於ける英佛に對する暗黙の威嚇即ち、西洋諸國が對獨戰を停止せざる限り協力の下に必要手段を執る協議は明らかにモロトフとの協定に何等根據を持たぬのである。「必要手段」は行はれなかつたか、或は失敗に終つたのである。かゝる行動に關係する代りにモロトフはソ聯の政策が中立である事を表明した。かくの如くトトラは東の門戸を閉じた代りに極めて高價な代償を支拂つたのである。

ロシヤ—フィンランド（四一〇頁）

フィンランド人が極めて英雄的態度でロシヤ人を阻止したことは疑がない。余の考へでは、ロシヤ、フィンランド間平和交渉の見込は今の所あまりない。ロシヤ軍は共產主義者の神である。自尊心或は自己保存の念だけによつても現當局をしてその軍の失はれたる威信再建の爲兵力の全部を集注さなければならぬであらう。

フィンランドはかゝる機軸には太刀打ち出来ない。その結果平和は蘇聯の條件通りに来るだらう。